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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Subject: Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's appointment with you on November 19

You have agreed to receive Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan on November 19 at 1:30 p.m. We have been informed by the Soviet Embassy that Mikoyan will be accompanied by Ambassador Dobrynin and by his interpreter, Mr. Vinogradov. I shall bring with me Ambassador Thompson and an interpreter. I have enclosed a biographic sketch of Mikoyan. (Attachment 1)

We agree with Mr. McCloy's suggestion that you may wish to make the following points clear on Cuba.

- a. There is a considerable record of conciliation and performance on both sides and the Soviets should not become unreasonable at this time just because of their difficulties with Castro.
- b. We cannot give up our overflights, which everyone in the Western Hemisphere now knows have played such an important role in maintaining the security of the Hemisphere.
- c. The kind of non-invasion statement that is contained in our draft declaration is the most that a President can constitutionally agree to, especially in the absence of the arrangements for verification and the safeguards which were agreed to in your correspondence with Khrushchev.
- d. It would be useful to both sides to wind up the matter quickly and with maximum good will, without trying to haggle over every word. The Cuban problem will remain; if the Cubans wish to normalize relations, we are ready and willing to talk with them about it. You may wish to discourage Mikoyan from discussing future Cuban-Western Hemisphere relations on the grounds that Castro should know what is necessary for Cuba to improve its relations with the countries of the Western Hemisphere. A position paper on this point and a paper on Chinese Communist influence in Cuba are attached (Attachments 2 and 3).

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You may wish to make the following points regarding the Sino-Indian dispute. A position paper is attached (Attachment 4).

- a. The United States is assisting India to meet its defense requirements at the specific request of the Government of India.

- b. United States assistance is designed to permit India to maintain its territorial integrity. It, therefore, does not constitute a threat to Communist China.

- c. The United States would like to see peace restored but not on terms imposed by force by Communist China.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E), 5010, 5020 AND 11

Re: 10

State NLK-77-1068  
By MJM NAPS. DATE 5-24-78

**TRANSCRIBED PAGE FOLLOWS**

(Page One)

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**Subject: Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's Appointment  
with You on November 29**

You have agreed to receive Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan on November 29 at 4:30 p.m. We have been informed by the Soviet Embassy that Mikoyan will be accompanied by Ambassador Dobrynin and by his interpreter, Mr. Vinogradov. I shall bring with me Ambassador Thompson and an interpreter. I have enclosed a biographic sketch of Mikoyan.

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-3-

We do not believe it desirable for you to raise the subject of Berlin. Should Mikoyan raise it, you may wish to discuss the problem along the lines of the instruction sent Ambassador Kohler for his talk with Semenov (copy attached, attachment 5).

Regarding Laos, you may wish to remind Mikoyan that in your talks with Khrushchev in Vienna and in subsequent talks between Harriman and Pushkin in Geneva, the Soviet Union committed itself to obtain two things which are of vital interest to the United States: the cessation of Viet Minh infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam and the withdrawal of the Viet Minh from Laos. The final international agreement embodying these understandings was signed on July 23 of this year. Our information is clear that neither of the two promises has been fulfilled.

We are also particularly concerned over the recent unwarranted attack by the Pathet Lao on an Air America plane attempting to deliver rice to the Plaine des Jarres. This attack, which resulted in the death of both the pilot and co-pilot, is a direct challenge to the authority of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma who requested the flight.

The United States engagement in Southeast Asia is most serious and, consequently, fulfillment of Soviet pledges there is of first importance. A position paper is attached (attachment 6).

Regarding a nuclear test ban, you may wish to point out that it is imperative that the nuclear powers reach early agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing. We are now ready to conclude an agreement banning tests in outer space, the atmosphere and underwater without prejudice to the continuing effort to reach agreement on banning underground tests. It is our firm view that agreement on the banning of underground tests should involve the principle of on-site inspection.

In connection with these steps, we would be interested in learning what possibilities the Soviet Government envisages of inducing Communist China to adhere to whatever nuclear test ban may be agreed on.

Regarding measures to reduce the risk of war through miscalculation, you may wish to note that Ambassador Dean has mentioned to the Soviet delegation in Geneva that there appear to be certain measures designed to reduce the risk of war concerning which a substantial amount of similarity already exists between our two countries. We have in mind such measures as (1) the establishment of improved communications between your side and ours, (2) advance notification regarding major military movements and (3) the exchange of military missions between our states, or groups of states, respectively. We are interested in exploring the prospects of agreement on these or similar measures designed to achieve

the same

the same end. We have heard that the USSR may again be interested in observation posts. We wonder if the Soviet Government has any further views on this matter. You might wish to state that if the Soviet Government were interested in proceeding with an arrangement for mutual exchange of observation posts apart from stage one of a disarmament agreement we would be glad to discuss such a plan.

If the Soviet Government agrees, we would like to give joint notification to the Acting Secretary General of the UN in the near future concerning the program for US-Soviet cooperation in outer space which was worked out by Dr. Dryden and Professor Slagonravov. If such notification is agreeable to the Soviet side, we would anticipate moving shortly thereafter to practical steps for implementing the program. A position paper is attached (attachment 7).

There are no strictly bilateral issues which merit being raised by you in this conversation. However it is possible that Mikoyan may raise the question of US-USSR Civil Air Agreement which was initialled but not signed in August 1961. A background memorandum on the subject is attached (attachment 8). Should Mikoyan urge that the agreement be signed now, you may wish to reply that after a satisfactory Cuban settlement has been reached and if progress can be made in one or two other fields, then the time may be ripe to sign the agreement.

Mikoyan may also raise the question of increased trade between the United States and the USSR. You may wish to reply that given the current state of our relations, it is understandable that American businessmen are reluctant to enter into extensive business relations with the USSR. An improvement in the political climate would probably lead to increased trade between our two countries.

Dean Rusk

Attachments:

1. Biographic sketch of A. I. Mikoyan.
2. Cuba - United States Relations.
3. Chinese Communist Influence in Cuba.
4. Sino Indian Border Conflict.
5. Copy of telegram to Moscow regarding Kohler talk with Semenov.
6. Laos.
7. Background of US-USSR Outer Space Cooperation.
8. US-Soviet Bilateral Air Agreement.

**MEMOIRS OF MINISTER OF  
INDUSTRIAL TRADE OF ARMENIA**

A. I. Mikoyan, a senior member of the Personnel of the Communist Party's Central Committee, has been an influential figure in the Soviet Union for many years. One of the few remaining old Bolsheviks in a position of authority, he has successfully threaded his way through almost five decades of abrupt political change. Mikoyan has served on the top policy making organ of the Central Committee continuously since 1923. In the Soviet government he was named First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1953 after serving 18 years as Deputy Chairman while holding various Ministerial posts. Over these years Mikoyan has gained a considerable reputation as a shrewd, hard-hitting, and skillful negotiator.

Mikoyan was born in 1895 in Armenia. He was graduated from the Armenian Theological Academy in 1915 but chose a political career, joining the Bolshevik Party in 1913. During the revolution and civil war, he allegedly organized workers and fought British occupation forces in the Caucasus. After holding a number of Party posts and being elected a Central Committee member in 1923, he was called to Moscow in 1926, where he was named candidate member of the Politburo and Commissar of Internal and Foreign Trade. During the 1930's he served as Commissar of Procurement and of the Food Industry. In 1936, he toured the United States to study food production methods, a trip to which Mikoyan attributes the introduction of ice cream and breakfast food into the Soviet Union. As Commissar of Foreign Trade in 1938, Mikoyan remained in that post with certain interruptions until the mid-1950's.

During World War II Mikoyan served on the powerful State Defense Committee, his first responsibility being the procurement of supplies for the Soviet army. As a member of a special Council for Evacuation within the Council of Peoples Commissars he helped plan the removal of industrial equipment and population from those areas in the path of the German advance.

Since the death of Stalin in 1953, Mikoyan has emerged as a top Party spokesman on economic and political affairs, frequently traveling abroad to negotiate questions of key importance to Soviet policy. In 1954 and 1955 he accompanied Khrushchev and Bulganin to Communist China and Yugoslavia. In early 1956 he made an extensive tour of the Middle and Far East to further Soviet trade objectives. During the Hungarian Revolution in late 1956 Mikoyan went to Budapest with Party Presidium member M. A. Suslov and General I. A. Serov to suppress the rebellion and restore Soviet control. He visited Austria in April 1957 and in August accompanied a delegation headed by Thrushev to West Germany. In 1958 he traveled to West Germany to negotiate economic and trade agreements, as well as a consular treaty. At the end of that year he headed a Party delegation to Poland. More recently his missions abroad have included trips to the United States (January 1959), Mexico (1959), Cuba and Norway (1960), Iraq (1960), Indonesia (1960), Japan (1961) and the African

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Guinea, Ghana and Mali - 1962).

Mikoyan has weathered many storms during his long career. He has been a consistent supporter of Khrushchev in the latter's attacks on Stalin and in the purge of the so-called anti-Party group. At the 20th Communist Party Congress in February 1956 he made the strongest attack against the late Soviet dictator that was contained in any Congress speech published by the Soviet press.

Mikoyan has a family of four children and several grandchildren. His wife, Ashkhen Lazarevna, died during the period of Mikoyan's stay in Cuba after a long illness. His brother, Artem, is a well-known Soviet aircraft designer.

**TRANSCRIBED PAGES FOLLOW**

(Page Four)

#### BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF ANASTAS IVANOVICH MIKOYAN

A.I. Mikoyan, a senior member of the Presidium of the Communist Party's Central Committee, has been an influential figure in the Soviet Union for many years. One of the few remaining old Bolsheviks in a position of authority, he has successfully threaded his way through almost five decades of abrupt political change. Mikoyan has served as the top-policy making organ of the Central Committee continuously since 1926. In the Soviet Government he was named First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1955 after serving 18 years as Deputy Chairman while holding various Ministerial posts. Over these years Mikoyan has gained a considerable reputation as a shrewd, hard-hitting, and skillful negotiator.

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(Page Five)

Guinea, Ghana and Mali (1962)

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## THE DIALECTICAL APPROACH

### CUBA AND THE AMERICAS

The Cuban Government, with "the people" of the Cuban province who are imbued with revolutionary ideas, is engaged in restructuring Cuban society along Marxist-Leninist lines and the USSR intends to continue its support of the Cuban People. These Cuban goals appear to be irreconcilable to the United States. They do not see the United States subject to the domination or in eventual Marxist-Leninist state over its borders, just as the USSR has learned to live with capitalist forces on its borders, and leave Cuba in peace?

### U.S. Position

Cuba is a hemispheric, not a United States problem. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS states have unanimously declared that the presence in the Western Hemisphere of a Marxist-Leninist state and its ties to extra-continental powers is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the inter-American system. In their communique of October 5, 1962, the Foreign Ministers characterized as a most urgent problem "Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba as an attempt to convert the island into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas and subversion of the democratic institutions of the Hemisphere." The continued presence in Cuba of Soviet troops constitutes one of the main bases for such hemispheric concern.

The United States has repeatedly declared that it does not seek to impose its system upon the Cuban people; rather, we believe the Cuban people should have the opportunity to decide for themselves, through truly free elections, the system they wish.

Through its demonstrated unwillingness to live at peace with its neighbors, Cuba is the source of tension in the Hemisphere. Cuban intervention in the internal affairs of nations in the Hemisphere can not be tolerated indefinitely. Venezuela is a case in point. The Government of President Betancourt, a former communist, has made significant advances for the benefit of the Venezuelan people; yet the Castro Government has consistently intervened in Venezuelan affairs.

Chinese Communist Influence in Cuba

The President may wish to elicit Mikoyan's assessment of the degree of Chinese communist influence in Cuba. Our assessment is that despite the latent Cuban sympathies for the militant Chinese line, Chinese influence in Cuba is not substantial, primarily because of Cuba's heavy economic dependence upon the USSR (for a recent analysis of Cuban-Chinese relations, please see attached report from the Canadian Ambassador at Havana).

Specifically, Mikoyan's reaction to the following would be interesting:

1. Reports emanating from Warsaw allege that some of the anti-aircraft (SA-2) missile sites are manned by Chinese Communists;
2. Reports from Cuban refugees allege that there are substantial numbers of Chinese communist troops in Cuba;
3. Our intelligence indicates that the Chinese are shipping rice and other foodstuffs to Cuba despite the serious shortages of food in China.

Attachment:

**TRANSCRIBED PAGES FOLLOW**

(Page Six)

Cuban-United States Relations

Anticipated Soviet Position:

The Cuban Government, with the support of the Cuban people who are imbued with revolutionary zeal, is engaged with maneuvering Cuban society along Marxist-Leninist lines and the USSR intends to continue its support of these Cuban efforts. These Cuban activities do not present a threat to the United States. Why does not the United States adjust to the presence of an eventual Marxist-Leninist state near its borders, and leave Cuba in peace?

Chinese Communist Influence in Cuba

The President may wish to elicit Mikoyan's assessment of the degree of Chinese Communist influence in Cuba. Our assessment is that despite the latent Cuban sympathies for the militant Chinese line, Chinese influence in Cuba is not substantial primarily because of Cuba's heavy economic dependence upon the USSR (for a recent analysis of Cuban-Chinese relations, please see attached report from the Canadian Ambassador at Habana).

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1. Reports emanating from Warsaw allege that some of the anti-aircraft (SA-2) missile sites are manned by Chinese Communists;
2. Reports from Cuban refugees allege that there are substantial members of Chinese communist troops in Cuba;
3. Our intelligence indicates that the Chinese are shipping rice and other foodstuffs to Cuba despite the serious shortage of food in China

Sino-Indian Border Conflict

We believe that the President should make clear to Mr. Mikoyan that the change in the application of India's nonalignment policy, under which it now receives Western military assistance, has come about entirely as the result of India's own initiative in response to Chinese Communist aggression. Further, it should be emphasized that the United States is aiding India to meet this attack on its territorial integrity and that United States aid, therefore, does not constitute a threat to China itself.

We have considered whether the President might suggest to Mr. Mikoyan that the USSR make efforts to promote a settlement of the conflict, and we have concluded that this is not the time for such a step. A move such as this might produce a proposal for a negotiated settlement in which we might ourselves be involved. A new proposal for negotiations at present would only complicate India's task since India is not likely to be receptive to it. We understand, and the British have confirmed this, that Indian leaders feel at present that no Indian Government could negotiate a compromise settlement and survive. Our view is that before Indian leaders would find it politically possible to make a compromise settlement, India would have to be strengthened and its confidence renewed.

Further, we believe it is important that the United States neither push the Indians forward nor hold them back at the present stage. They should make their own decisions regarding whether they enter negotiations, continue the truce, or resume the conflict. A United States suggestion that the Soviets attempt to promote a settlement might lead to a proposal which involved the United States and caused it to violate this precept.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), G.O., S(E) AND 11

State (NLK-77-1068)RE: MFM M.D.C. DATE 5/24/78

MAY 22/62.

Duplicate copy of attachment to fourth

Ref. Moscow: 1019

## LIMIT DISTRIBUTION- S/C

1. We have assumed that in post-Cuba phase Soviets might (a) show by their attitude in other areas of difference with West that they have abandoned upon a fairly radical course of policy change within which eventual discussions on Berlin would fall into natural place, or (b) were likely, in absence of such broad policy change, to open talks on Berlin within the framework of previous exchanges but possibly with some changes in past positions. President said to Adenauer during recent visit that, if Krushchev meets our requirements in Cuba, we might inquire as to Soviet proposals on Berlin without, however, making any of our own for time being.

2. Although certain aspects of Cuban situation remain unresolved, we want to take advantage of opportunity provided by Semenov's opening to initiate probe present direction of Soviet thinking on Berlin. (While you should make clear at outset that you are undertaking talks with him on personal basis without any governmental commitment although both you and he will presumably be reporting to your principals, we realistically assume that you will be regarded as speaking on basis of at least general instructions.)

3. A solid settlement in Berlin on terms that keep the city free and viable is a target of high priority for us, and we do not wish to miss any opportunity that may now exist for a Berlin settlement. You should maintain the position that since the Soviet Government started the Berlin crisis, the initiative for new proposals should rest with Moscow, but you should leave no doubt that we are much interested in a workable settlement. You should point out that we see no good in facing difficult negotiations with Germans and French except in terms of a real prospect of settlement.

4. As we see it, there are two broad possibilities for such a settlement. One is a de facto continuation of the status quo, in which any peace treaty would leave the real situation unchanged, and each side would interpret the position in its own way. This is probably easier to negotiate but less satisfactory for the long pull than a broader settlement. The terms of a wider agreement must include for us plainly acknowledged right of Western troops presence and improved access rights like those proposed under our international access authority. A number of adjustments of interest to the Soviets could be made in return for improved access and wholly accepted presence. Without communicating all of the above to Semenov, you should make it plain to him that any Berlin settlement which shifts from the status quo must include advantages for us as well as for them, and that the advantages of greatest interest to us are improved access and a wholly acknowledged right of Western presence. It would be appropriate to indicate that we would be interested in knowing how Soviets would conceive a wider agreement including these two features.

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E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

3.

Walt (NLK-77-1068)

27 May N.Y.D. DATE 5/24/78

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5. Since Semenov will probably not be able to respond immediately to this point, you should also endeavor to urge him out as to the significance of his remark that the Cuban crisis was not without its implications for German problem. As you know, lessons which Soviets have presumably drawn from Cuban experience have been subject of considerable speculation but of little hard information. One line which has been put out through both satellite and direct sources is that lesson of Cuba is that, if both sides are prepared to make concessions as in Cuban case, then similar willingness of both sides to make concessions on Berlin should likewise lead to resolution of that problem. Should Semenov take this position, you might point out that, in discussions of past 16 months, we have already indicated a number of areas in which West has indicated willingness to make accommodations. However, compromise cannot extend to what we have defined as our vital interests in Berlin situation, although even here we are willing to look at situation in endeavor to examine modalities provided any changes are consistent with safeguarding of those vital interests.

6. A further point which it might be useful to probe would be role now assigned to peace treaty by Soviets. We have noted recent de-emphasis of peace treaty in both Soviet and GDR statements. Semenov will undoubtedly continue to pay lip service to peace treaty, but we would be interested in your impressions from talking with him that this is definitely on back burner.

7. We are much interested in Khrushchev's recent conversation with Ambassador Roberta and his suggestion that troops might remain temporarily under a certain unspecified UN role. In the degree that this could be a face-saver for Soviets while Allied troop presence and guarantees remain, this proposal is of real interest to us. A major purpose of your talks with Semenov should therefore be to ascertain whether this suggestion represents a real shift in the Soviet position or is merely a device for limiting both the duration and the effectiveness of Western presence. You should make it clear that we cannot express any judgment on what they have in mind until they have spelled it out. You might, for example, seek to determine what the Soviets have in mind among such possibilities (without offering them a catalog for shopping) as following: (a) simple registration of any agreement on Berlin with UN, (b) agreement to report to UN on such matters as the size, composition, and activities of forces in Berlin, (c) some form of UN representation and authority in West Berlin, (d) some new status involving West Berlin request for Allied troops under some UN umbrella, (e) move of elements of UN itself to West Berlin, (f) a UN role in other respects than troop presence - as for example access or performance of Hall. You should probe us to the role and authority of West Berlin Senate, Western garrisons, and Federal Republic under any such arrangements. In all this, you should make it clear that we could accept no arrangement which did not allow visible continuation of our own guarantees of the freedom of West Berlin, and we repeat that you should avoid any suggestion of a U.S. position on such possibilities.

8. You are familiar with standard arguments made repeatedly by Secretary in his numerous conversations with Soviets over past 16 months. To extent you find insurable, you should repeat those arguments as appropriate. We

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and the USSR in our joint communiqué that you mentioned last weekend we may say is that we have defined as our chief interests in Berlin situation. Our position is that of reasonable and active strength and reasonable force both been demonstrated.

9. We believe bargaining should suffice for exchange with Semenov. With your knowledge of US-Soviet bilateral exchanges, you will recognize anything really new or significant which he might say and can exercise judgment as to whether to pursue it by discreet questioning.

10. We would hope that you would have lunch with Semenov without this getting to press corps. While we accept inevitability of your having to brief French, British, and German colleagues, at least in general, on your discussion, we would also hope that information could be limited to them. In talking with them, you should be careful to avoid giving impression that you are in any way negotiating rather than engaging purely in probing operation on informal basis at Soviet initiative. President is dubious about possibility of carrying out really useful exchanges with Soviets if we follow usual procedure of full briefings for them and then for NATO. In past, this has led either to leaks and public disclosure of Allied differences before reactions of Soviets have been ascertained, or to debate within Alliance on theoretical points which have not played role in talks with Soviets. While President is therefore prepared to have you initiate probe with Semenov, at appropriate point he may wish to use other channels.

**TRANSCRIBED PAGES FOLLOW**

(Page Nine)

Verbatim Copy of Telegram to Moscow

Ref: Moscow 1389

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION - S/S

1. We have assumed that in post-Cuba phase Soviets might (a) show by their attitude in other areas of difference with West that they have embarked upon a fairly radical course of policy change which eventual discussions on Berlin would fall into natural place, or (b) more likely, in absence of such broad policy change, reopen talks in Berlin within the framework of previous exchanges but possibly with some changes in past positions. President said to Adenauer during recent visit that, if Khrushchev meets our requirements in Cuba, we might inquire as to Soviet proposals on Berlin without, however, making any of our own for the time being.

(Page Ten)

3. Since Semenov will probably not be able to respond immediately to this hint, you should also endeavor to draw him out as to the significance of his remark that the Cuban crisis was not without its implications for German problem. As you know, lessons which Soviets have presumably drawn from Cuban experience have been subject of considerable speculation but of little hard information. One line which has been put out through both satellite and direct courses is that lesson of Cuba is that, if both sides are prepared to make concessions as in Cuban case, then similar willingness of both sides to make concessions on Berlin should likewise lead to resolution of that problem. Should Semenov take this position, you might point out that, in discussions of past 16 months, we have already indicated a number of areas in which West has indicated willingness to make accommodations. However, compromise cannot extend to what we have defined as our vital interests in Berlin situation, although even here we are willing to look at situation in endeavor to examine modalities provided any changes are consistent with safeguarding of those vital interests.

(Page Eleven)

would want to avoid giving impression that our position has weakened in any way on what we have defined as our vital interests in Berlin situation. Our position is that of reasonable man whose strength and restraint have both been demonstrated.

9. We believe foregoing should suffice for exchange with Semenov. With your knowledge of US-Soviet bilateral exchanges, you will recognize anything really new or significant which he might say and can exercise judgment as to whether to pursue it by discrete questioning.

2005

On Tuesday, November 27, what is believed to have been 37mm anti-aircraft fire from Pathet Lao batteries forced an Air America C-123 to crash land near the Plaine des Jarres airport. Both the pilot and co-pilot were killed. A third member of the crew was injured and was evacuated to Mantians. The plane, prior to being shot down, had already been cleared for landing and was attempting at the request of Souvanna Phouma to make a routine rice delivery to his forces at the Plaine des Jarres.

On November 23 Pathet Lao General Singkaps threatened that the Pathet Lao would "energetically adopt appropriate measures to deal with future violations by planes of any country or party of the airspace of the forces' liberated areas." We are, therefore, led to believe that this was a premeditated act on the part of the Pathet Lao. These supply flights were requested by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and none of the supplies involved were of a military nature. The United States Government has indicated that these flights would be open to inspection by the Lao authorities and/or the International Control Commission.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

Dept. of State (NLK-77-1068)  
BY [initials] N. # DATE 5/24/78

Motivation of USSR-Soviet Space Cooperation

On February 21, Chairman Khrushchev offered congratulations on the Glenn flight and suggested that the US and the USSR get together on outer space programs. President Kennedy responded affirmatively on February 22 and on March 1 made concrete proposals to get such a program underway. On March 20, Chairman Khrushchev indicated Soviet readiness to discuss the proposals.

From March 27 through March 30, Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy Administrator of NASA, and Academician A. A. Blagonravov held preliminary talks in New York. Representatives of the USSR and the US, headed by Blagonravov and Dr. Dryden, respectively, met in Geneva May 29 through June 7 to discuss potential areas of cooperation. On June 8, a joint communique was issued at Geneva which stated that a recommended program was being forwarded to the respective governments.

The three specific projects under this program involved (1) exchange of data from weather satellites and the eventual coordinated launching of such satellites, (2) a joint effort to map the magnetic field of the earth by means of coordinated geomagnetic satellite launchings and ground observations, and (3) cooperation in the experimental relay of communications via the ECHO satellite. It was also agreed that there should be further discussion of the possibility of broader cooperation in experiments using active communications satellites to be launched in the future.

On July 9, Dr. Dryden sent a letter to Blagonravov stating that the United States had no objections to the recommended program. The Department of State confirmed Dr. Dryden's letter on August 29 in a note sent to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M. V. Zeldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, wrote a letter dated October 21 to NASA Administrator, James E. Webb, stating that Soviet scientists were prepared to begin implementation of the Dryden-Blagonravov agreement.

To date the details of this agreement have not been officially given to the public.

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E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 3(D), 3(E) AND 11

Department of State (WJK:77-1068)  
BY MFM DATE 5/24/78

~~SECRET//COMINT//REF ID: A65212~~

Just a fortnight ago, during the initialized Civil Air Agreement with the USSR was made publicly known less than one week ago when General Schlesinger, First Deputy Chairman of Aeroflot raised the question, on his government's behalf, to Tikhonov, the Administrator of the Soviet Civil Aviation Agency. General Schlesinger informed that his government might withdraw its own signature to the treaty unless we were ready to proceed.

Background. The agreed text of a Civil Air Transport Agreement between the US and USSR was initialed on August 21, 1961. Negotiations for reciprocal air services between New York and Moscow were undertaken in accordance with provisions of the 1959 agreement with the Soviet Union on scientific, technical, educational, and cultural exchanges. At the time of initialing, the United States announced that, in view of the international situation, it had decided that the time was not appropriate to sign the Civil Air Transport Agreement.

Since the initialing of the agreement, the United States has become aware of a determined Soviet campaign to effect the penetration of the underdeveloped countries through the medium of civil aviation. The Soviets are clearly making a major effort to extend Aeroflot services to the underdeveloped countries as well as to gain a foothold in their civil aviation programs. Over the past months the Department has worked on plans for frustrating these Soviet designs. We cannot anticipate complete success for our endeavors but believe that through cooperation with our allies, we can effectively thwart Soviet penetration in those areas we consider particularly vital.

The conclusion of a Civil Air Transport Agreement between the US and the USSR at this time would substantially alter this possibility by undermining the basis of our approach to the underdeveloped countries. Therefore, the present bilateral Civil Air Agreement should be signed in its present form only as part of a larger settlement.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, SEC. 3(E), 5(D), 5(E) AND 11

Note (UNK-77-1068)  
ST THM M&S, DATE 5/24/78

**TRANSCRIBED PAGE FOLLOWS**

(Page Thirteen)

US-SOVIET AIR AGREEMENT

Soviet interest in signing the initialled Civil Air Agreement with the U.S. was most recently indicated less than two weeks ago when General Schetchnikov, First Deputy Chief of Aeroflot raised the question, on his government's instructions. With Mr. [Halaby?], the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency. General Schetchnikov indicated that his government might withdraw its own agreement to the draft unless we were ready to proceed.

**EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

9  
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Document # 20

4

SANITIZED

EXCISE

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: 2/3

FROM: EHR - Richard H. Davis

SUBJECT: Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan's Call on the President.

Attached is a Memorandum to the President covering topics which may be discussed in the conversation which Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan will have with the President on November 29 at 4:30 p.m. It is recommended that you approve the memorandum for forwarding to the President.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
REVIEWED BY	SM DATE 5/4/84
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TS AUTH.	REASON(S)
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Attachment:

Memorandum for the President.

SANITIZED  
Authority NLJ 84-6

By inc., NARS, Date 29-85

~~SECRET~~

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

**Subject: Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan's Appointment  
with You on November 29**

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Dear Frank

Attachments:

1. Biographic sketch of A. I. Mikoyan.
2. Cuba - United States Relations.
3. Chinese Communist Influence in Cuba.
4. Sino Indian Border Conflict.
5. Copy of telegram to Moscow regarding Schlesinger's talk with Gromecov.
6. Laos.
7. Background of US-ECSS Outer Space Corporation.
8. US-Soviet Bilateral Air Agreement.

**EXTERIOR SOURCE OF  
ALLIED SPYWARE MIKOYAN**

A. T. Mikoyan, a senior member of the Presidium of the Communist Party's Central Committee, has been an influential figure in the Soviet Union for many years. One of the few remaining old Bolsheviks in a position of authority, he has successfully threaded his way through almost five decades of abrupt political change. Mikoyan has served on the top policy making organ of the Central Committee continuously since 1924. In the Soviet Government he was named First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR in 1958 after serving 18 years as Deputy Chairman while holding various Ministerial posts. Over these years Mikoyan has gained a considerable reputation as a shrewd, hard-hitting, and skillful negotiator.

Mikoyan was born in 1895 in Armenia. He was graduated from the Armenian Theological Academy in Tiflis but chose a political career, joining the Bolshevik Party in 1915. During the revolution and civil war, he allegedly organized workers and fought British occupation forces in the Caucasus. After holding a number of Party posts and being elected a Central Committee member in 1922, he was called to Moscow in 1926, where he was named candidate member of the Politburo and Commissar of Internal and Foreign Trade. During the 1930's he served as Commissar of Procurement and of the Food Ministry. In 1936, he toured the United States to study food production methods, a trip to which Mikoyan attributes the introduction of ice cream and breakfast food into the Soviet Union. Made Commissar of Foreign Trade in 1938, Mikoyan remained in that post with certain interruptions until the mid-1950's.

During World War II Mikoyan served on the powerful State Defense Committee, his first responsibility being the procurement of supplies for the Soviet army. As a member of a special Council for Evacuation within the Council of Peoples Comissars he helped plan the removal of industrial equipment and population from those areas in the path of the German advance.

Since the death of Stalin in 1953, Mikoyan has emerged as a top Party spokesman on economic and political affairs, frequently traveling abroad to negotiate questions of key importance to Soviet policy. In 1954 and 1955 he accompanied Khrushchev and Bulganin to Communist China and Yugoslavia. In early 1956 he made an extensive tour of the Middle and Far East to further Soviet trade objectives. During the Hungarian Revolution in late 1956 Mikoyan went to Budapest with Party Presidium member M. A. Suslov and General I. A. Serov to suppress the rebellion and restore Soviet control. He visited Austria in April 1957 and in August accompanied a delegation headed by Khrushchev to West Germany. In 1958 he traveled to West Germany to negotiate economic and trade agreements, as well as a coacial treaty. At the end of that year he headed a Party delegation to Poland. More recently his missions abroad have included trips to the United States (January 1959), Mexico (1959), Cuba and Norway (1960), Iraq (1960), Indonesia (1962), Japan (1962) and West Africa

(Wilson, Chom and Holt - 1962).

Mikoyan has weathered many storms during his long career. He has been a consistent supporter of Khrushchev in the latter's attacks on Stalin and in the purge of the so-called anti-Party group. At the 20th Communist Party Congress in February 1956 he made the strongest attack against the late Soviet dictator that was contained in any Congress speech published by the Soviet press.

Mikoyan has a family of four children and several grandchildren. His wife, Aspasia Lazaravna, died during the period of Mikoyan's stay in Cuba after a long illness. His brother, Aron, is a well-known Soviet aircraft designer.

Attachment #2.

Cuba-United States Relations

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Chinese Communist Influence in Cuba

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Attachments:

Attachment 4.

~~Redacted~~  
Sino Soviet Border Conflict

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11/28/62

Verbatim copy of telegram to Moscow

Rm: Moscow's 1339.


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~~Attachment #6.~~

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Attachment 7.

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Background of US-Soviet Outer Space Cooperation

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Attachment #8.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ **DEFINITIVE NEUTRAL AIR AGREEMENT**

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